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In light of Deng-Long-Liu’s two-step secret direct communication protocol using the
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pair block [Phys. Rev. A 68, 042317 (2003)], by introducing
additional local operations for encoding, we propose a brand-new secure direct com-
munication protocol, in which two legitimate users can simultaneously transmit their
different secret messages to each other in a set of quantum communication device.
PACS Number(s): 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an ingenious application of quantum mechanics, in which
two remote legitimate users (Alice and Bob) establish a shared secret key through the transmission
of quantum signals. Much attention has been focused on QKD after the pioneering work of Bennett
and Brassard published in 1984 [1]. Till now there have been many theoretical QKDs [2-19]. They
can be classified into two types, the nondeterministic one [2-14] and the deterministic one [15-19].
The nondeterministic QKD can be used to establish a shared secret key between Alice and Bob,
consisting of a sequence of random bits. This secret key can be used to encrypt a message which
is sent through a classical channel. In contrast, in the deterministic QKD, the legitimate users
can get results deterministically provided that the quantum channel is not disturbed. It is more
attractive to establish a deterministic secure direct communication protocol by taking advantage
of the deterministic QKDs. However, different from the deterministic QKDs, the deterministic
secure direct communication protocol is more demanding on the security. Hence, only recently a
few of deterministic secure direct protocols have been proposed [15-16,19]. One of these protocols
is Deng-Long-Liu’s two-step quantum direct communication protocol using the EPR pair block
[19]. It is provably secure and has a high capacity. However, this deterministic secure direct
protocol is also a message-unilaterally-transmitted protocol as well as the protocols in [15-16],
i.e., two parties can not simultaneously transmit their different secret messages to each other
in a set of quantum communication device. In general, convenient bidirectional simultaneous
mutual communications are very useful and usually desired. In this paper in light of Deng-
Long-Liu’s communication protocol, by introducing additional local operations for encoding, we
propose a secure direct bidirectional communication protocol, in which two legitimate users can
simultaneously transmit their secret messages to each other in a set of quantum communication
device.
Let us start with a brief description of the two-step protocol. Alice prepares an ordered N EPR
photon pairs in state |Ψ〉CM = |Ψ−〉 = (|0〉C |1〉M − |1〉C |0〉M )/
√
2 for each and divides them into
2two partner-photon sequences [C1, C2, . . . , CN ] and [M1,M2, . . . ,MN ], where Ci (Mi) stands for
the C (M) photon in the ith photon pair. Then she sends the C photon sequence to Bob. Bob
chooses randomly a fraction of photons in the C sequence and tells Alice publicly which photons
he has chosen. Then Bob chooses randomly one of two measurement bases (MB), say σz or σx, to
measure the chosen photons and tells Alice which MB he has chosen for each and the corresponding
measurement result. Alice uses the same MB as Bob to measure the corresponding partner photons
in the M sequence and checks with Bob’s result. Their results should be anticorrelated with each
other provided that no eavesdropping exists [16]. If Eve is in the line, they have to discard their
transmission and abort the communication. Otherwise, Alice performs the unitary operations on
the unmeasured photons in the M sequence to encode her messages according to the following
correspondences: U0 ↔ 00; U1 ↔ 01; U2 ↔ 10; U3 ↔ 11, where U0 = I = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|,
U1 = σz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|, U2 = σx = |1〉〈0| + |0〉〈1|, U3 = iσy = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0|. Then Alice
sends Bob the photons on which unitary operations has been performed . After Bob receives
the photons, he perform Bell-basis measurement on each with its partner photon in the initial
pair. Since U0|Ψ−〉 = |Ψ−〉, U1|Ψ−〉 = |Ψ+〉, U2|Ψ−〉 = |Φ−〉 and U3|Ψ−〉) = |Φ+〉, Bob can
extract Alice’s encoding according to his measurement results. By the way, in Alice’s second
transmissions, a small trick like message authentification is used by Alice to detect on Eve’s attack
without eavesdropping. In [19], the security of the two-step protocol is proven.
Let us turn to our protocol. We only revise the two-step protocol in a subtle way, however, the
function of the protocol is changed excitedly, i.e., two legitimate users can transmit simultaneously
their different secret messages to each other in a set of quantum communication device. When
Bob receives the photons on which Alice has performed unitary operations to encode her messages,
he does not perform the Bell-basis measurements on each with its partner photon in the initial
pair at once but carry out a unitary operation (i.e., U0, U1, U2 or U3) on anyone photon of the
initial pair to encode his own message. After his unitary operations Bob performs the Bell-basis
measurements on the photon pairs and publicly announces his measurement results. Since Bob
knows which unitary operation he has performed on one photon of each pair, he can still extract
Alice’s encodings according to his measurement results (See Table 1). Meanwhile since Alice
knows which unitary operation she has performed on one photon of each pair, also she can
extract Bob’s encodings according to Bob’s public announcements of his measurement results
(See Table 1). So far we have proposed a deterministic direct bidirectional communication protocol.
Table 1. Corresponding relations among Alice’s, Bob’s unitary operations (i.e., the
encoding bits) and Bob’s Bell measurement results on the photon pair. Alice’s
(Bob’s) unitary operations are listed in the first column (line).
U0(00) U1(01) U2(10) U3(11)
U0(00) |Ψ−〉 |Ψ+〉 |Φ−〉 |Φ+〉
U1(01) |Ψ+〉 |Ψ−〉 |Φ+〉 |Φ−〉
U2(10) |Φ−〉 |Φ+〉 |Ψ−〉 |Ψ+〉
U3(11) |Φ+〉 |Φ−〉 |Ψ+〉 |Ψ−〉
3Let us discuss the security of our protocol. Before Bob’s announcement, the present protocol
is only nearly same with the two step protocol due to the additional unitary operations of Bob.
However, since all the photons are in Bob’s hand, Eve can not know which unitary operation Bob
has performed at all. In fact, in this case the essence of our protocol is the two-step protocol. Hence
it is secure for Bob to get the secret message from Alice according to his Bell-basis measurements.
Although later Bob publicly announces his Bell measurement results, because he has performed
unitary operations which Eve can not know at all, Eve still can not know which unitary operations
Alice has ever performed. Hence, it is still secure for Bob to get the secret message from Alice via
our protocol. Now that Eve can not know which unitary operations Alice has performed and Bob
publicly announces his measurement results, Alice can securely know which unitary operation Bob
has ever performed, i.e., she can extract securely Bob’s encodings. Hence the present quantum
dense coding protocol is secure against eavesdropping. As for Eve’s attack without eavesdropping,
we can also adopt the strategy as the trick in [19] to detect it.
To summarize, we have proposed a deterministic secure direct bidirectional communication
protocol by using the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pair block. In this protocol two legitimate users
can simultaneously transmit their different secret messages to each other in a set of quantum
communication device.
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